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HIGHWAY TO THE DANGER ZONE: UTAHNS FOR BETTER
TRANSPORTATION V UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH HIGHWAY EXPANSION
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1970, the United States' population has increased by
thirty-eight percent and the number of miles Americans drive every
year has increased by one hundred and forty-eight percent; yet the
amount of new roads built has increased by a mere six percent.1
Nationally, these increases have led to political lobbyists, environ-
mental groups and construction companies all fighting over billions
of dollars in highway funding.2 Utah is a state caught in this web of
growth and conflict.3 Specifically, by the year 2020, the population
of the five counties along the Great Salt Lake's eastern shore in
Utah will increase by sixty percent.4 Consequently, travel demand
in these areas will increase by sixty-nine percent.5
Since 1980, the number of miles driven by Utah residents has
increased by seventy percent. 6 The Utah Quality Growth Public/
Private Partnership reported that if growth continues, the miles
traveled by vehicles each day in northern Utah will double by 2020. 7
In addition, it is estimated that by 2020 vehicle miles traveled per
day in Salt Lake and Davis counties will increase from twenty-five
1. See AMERICAN HIGHWAY USERS ALLIANCE, Why We Need Highways: Congestion,
available at http://www.highways.org/subsection.cfm?section=2&subsection=2 (last
visited April 3, 2004) (discussing traffic congestion and problems for commuters).
2. See Scott Bowles, National Gridlock- Traffic Really is Worse Than Ever. Here's
Why, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1999, at IA (citing first study ranking nation's worst
chronic traffic jams).
3. See generally Zack Van Eyck, Salt Lake 41st Most Congested City, DESERET NEws,
available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,515036103,00.html (Oct. 3,
2003) (noting Utah's travel problems and possible solutions).
4. See Utahns for Better Transportation v. United States Department of Trans-
portation, 305 F.3d 1152, 1161 (10th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Utahns 1] (discussing
population increases in state of Utah).
5. See id. (noting travel demand increases in Utah).
6. See Michael Kuzminaki, Note, Let there be Light, Air and Views: It's Time to Take
Another Look at Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVrL. L. 311 (stating growth in number of miles driven by Utah residents).
7, See id. (citation ommited) (discussing results of transportation study). Ex-
perts estimate that between 1995 and 2020 urban areas in northern Utah will
double in size, and its population will increase by one million. See id.
(61)
1
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million to fifty million per day.8 Recently, the annual Texas Trans-
portation Institute ranked Salt Lake City, Utah as the forty-first
most congested metropolitan area in the United States. 9 In re-
sponse, the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) began
analyzing proposed transportation projects to serve Utah's ever-in-
creasing transportation needs.10 To meet such needs, UDOT has
estimated that it will need more than $13 billion in funding for
transportation, but only $3.6 billion is expected to be available in
the future.11
In Utahns for Better Transportation v. United States Department of
Transportation (Utahns Ii),12 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
highway expansion and statutory regulations under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act
(CWA).13 After analyzing the Final Environmental Impact State-
ment (FEIS), the Tenth Circuit found the FEIS inadequately pre-
pared because it failed to consider the proposed project's
environmental impacts and any reasonable alternatives to the pro-
ject.14 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held that the United States
Corps of Engineers (Corps) arbitrarily and capriciously issued the
required permit under section 404 of the CWA, permitting con-
struction of the proposed project to begin. 15
8. See id. (citing Brent Israelsen, Will New Highway Put Utah Pollution Over the
Top, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 9, 1997, at A15) (estimating future number of vehicle
miles to be traveled).
9. See Van Eyck, supra note 3 (discussing annual study of traffic congestion).
According to UDOT spokesman Tom Hudachko, "[w]e can't build our way out
congestion, but there's definitely things we can do to help manage the demand."
Id.
10. See Zack Van Eyck, UDOT is Looking 30 Years Ahead, DESERET NEWS, availa-
ble at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,515036410,00.html (October 4,
2003) (explaining UDOT released plan dubbed Transportation 2030 for public
comment and UDOT's role).
11. See id. Utah Department of Transportation has developed a plan named
"Transportation 2030", which requires 3.6 billion dollars for projects such as 1-84
and 1-80 improvements. Id.
12. 305 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2002).
13. See id. at 1164 (addressing Utahns' arguments that federal agencies vio-
lated NEPA and CWA).
14. See id. at 1192 (concluding that FEIS was inadequate because federal agen-
cies (1) eliminated railway as alternative, (2) failed to consider alternative sequenc-
ing of project and integrating parkway and transit and (3) overlooked impacts on
wildlife).
15. See id. (holding that Corp's arbitrarily and capriciously issued permit by
relying on insufficient information). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
provides that final agency actions are subject to judicial review if no adequate rem-
edy exists. See id. at 1164. The APA enables a court to set aside arbitrary and
capricious agency decisions. See id.
2
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This Note focuses on the statutory role a federal agency has as
protector of the environment and an agency's responsibilities
under NEPA and the CWA.16 Section II of this Note provides a
brief summary of the facts of Utahns IL1 7 Section III examines the
relevant legal principles and effects of NEPA, Environmental Im-
pact Statements (EIS), section 404(b) permits of the CWA and rele-
vant past precedent.18 Section IV discusses the Tenth Circuit's
rationale in partly reversing the lower court's decision that the Fed-
eral Highway Association (FHWA) and the Corps acted lawfully
when they approved the construction of the Legacy Parkway.19 Sec-
tion V critically analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision, focusing on
issues that the court glossed over, but could have affected the
court's final decision. 20 Lastly, Section VI concludes by assessing
the potential impact the Tenth Circuit's decision could have on fu-
ture highway projects and the roles of various federal agencies in
protecting the environment.21
II. FACTS
In July 1996, responding to Utah's growing transportation
problems, Utah's governor announced plans to construct a new
highway called the Legacy Parkway.22 The overall interstate high-
way plan proposed to construct a four-lane, 14-mile, state-funded
highway known as the Legacy Parkway, to expand Interstate 15 and
to expand public transit.2 3 The Legacy Parkway landed at the heart
16. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001) (providing primary basis for federal wet-
lands regulation); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4332 (2001) (describing process federal agen-
cies must follow to assess particular action's environmental impacts).
17. For discussion of the facts of Utahns II, see infra notes 22-44 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a further discussion of the underlying principles behind NEPA, EIS
and CWA section 404 and relevant case law, see infra notes 45-110 and accompany-
ing text.
19. For a further discussion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis, see infta notes 111-
65 and accompanying text.
20. For a critical analysis of the Tenth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 166-
202 and accompanying text.
.21. For a further discussion of the impact of the Tenth Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
22. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152, 1161 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that Mayor
Ross C. Anderson announced highway plan to meet Utah's travel needs and popu-
lation increases).
23. See Utahns for Better Transportation v. United States Department of
Transportation, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1288 (D. Utah 2001) [hereinafter Utahns 1]
(describing proposed highway project). The highway project approved by FHWA
provided for:
a four-lane, limited access, divided highway extending approximately 22.5
kilometers (14 miles) from 1-215 at 2100 Moth in Salt Lake City, Utah,
3
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of the three-part plan known as the "Shared Solution", which
Utah's officials developed to solve future transportation
problems.2 4 The Legacy Parkway would connect to the current in-
terstate highway system; however, this would involve filling 114
acres of wetland.25
Naturally, filling wetlands required approval from the FHWA
and a section 404(b) permit from the Corps. 26 As part of this ap-
proval process, UDOT and its private contractors started preparing
a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) following the Gov-
ernor's announcement in 1996.27 Then, in June 2000, the FHWA
and the Corps decided to adopt UDOT's DEIS, and subsequently
released a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for public
review.
2 8
In December 2000, before the federal agencies even approved
the project, UDOT awarded private contractors the contract for
constructing the Legacy Parkway.29 A month later, the Corps re-
northward to 1-15 and U.S. 89 near Farmington City, Utah. The Legacy
Parkway is located within both Salt Lake City County and Davis County.
Overpasses (no access) will be provided at Center Street in North Salt
Lake, and Glovers Lane, State Street, and Burke Lane in Farmington.
Underpasses will be provided at Sheep Road, Denver & Rio Grande
(D&RG) Rail Road, and 1250 West in Centerville. Interchanges will be
provided at 1-215 in Salt Lake City, 5000 South in Woods Cross, Parrish
Lane in Centerville, and 1-15/U.S. 89 in Farmington. The Legacy Park-
way is fully funded by the State of Utah.
Id.
24. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1161 (outlining Utah's proposed transportation
plan). The plan included expanding Interstate 15 and mass transit and building
the Legacy Parkway. See id. The plan intended to prepare Utah's infrastructure to
meet future population and travel demands. See id. The Legacy Parkway would be
"330 feet wide consisting of four lanes, a 65.6-foot median, a 59-foot berm and
utility corridor, and a 13.1-foot pedestrian/equestrian/bike trail." Id. (describing
proposed layout of Legacy Parkway).
25. See id. (discussing environmental effects of proposed project). The wet-
lands surrounding this area provide a habitat for various birds, reptiles, amphibi-
ans and mammals, some of which are endangered. See id. Utah's total land area
consists of only 1.5 percent wetlands. See id. The Legacy Parkway will connect to
highway US 89, qualifying it as a federal action. See id.
26. See id. (noting project must receive FHWA approval and permit from
Corps because it requires filling wetlands and connecting new highway to inter-
state highway system ).
27. See id. (noting that drafting EIS was necessary because project was major
federal action that required FHWA and Corp approval).
28. See id. at 1161 (stating timeline of process for approving project and grant-
ing permit). Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare
an EIS prior to taking a major federal action, an action with major effects on the
environment and which are potentially subject to federal control. 42 U.S.C.
§ 102(2) (c) (2001) (outlining NEPA requirements).
29. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1162 (outlining steps taken for project approval);
Legacy Parkway Project, available at http://www.udot.utah.gov/legacy/ (last visited
[Vol. XVI: p. 61
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leased its Record of Decision (ROD) that granted UDOT the re-
quired section 404(b) permit.30 Thereafter, the FHWA issued its
ROD approving UDOT's requests to add and modify the current
interstate highway system's access points.3 1
Utah residents and Salt Lake City's Mayor strongly opposed
the proposed project immediately after the Corps granted UDOT
the section 404 permit and the FHWA approved UDOT's request
for highway additions and modifications. 32 Utahns found the pro-
posed highway project highly problematic, claiming that other less
environmentally damaging alternatives existed.33 Despite this op-
position, constructing the Legacy Parkway began in January 2001.3 4
The plaintiffs, Utahns for Better Transportation, Mayor Rocky
Anderson and the Sierra Club (collectively, Utahns) commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, Northern Division against the Corps, the FHWA and UDOT,
among other defendants.3 5 Specifically, the Utahns asked the court
to vacate the Corp's decision to grant the section 404 permit for
constructing the highway. 36 They also urged the court to reject the
FEIS and order the FEIS be revised or supplemented.3 7 In support
of these claims, the Utahns contended that the FEIS failed to con-
sider possible practicable alternatives to constructing the Legacy
April 3, 2004) (describing Legacy Parkway Project on UDOT's official website).
UDOT and its private contractors, Fluor Ames Kramer, began preparing a DEIS
immediately after the transportation plan was announced. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d
at 1161.
30. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1161 (outlining approval process); see generally 33
U.S.C. § 1344 (2001).
31. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1161 (describing FHWA's ROD).
32. See Utahns I, 180 F. Supp. 2d. 1286, 1288 (D. Utah 2001) (determining
whether FHWA and Corps acted lawfully). The residents and the mayor of Salt
Lake City wanted public transit expanded before constructing a highway that
would go through the wetlands. See id.
33. See id. at 1287-88 (explaining Utahns' chief arguments). They wanted the
federal agencies to conduct further environmental impact analysis. See id. (discuss-
ing Utahns' judicial remedy sought).
34. See Legacy Parkway Project: History available at http://www.udot.
utah.gov/legacy/Project%20-History.htm (last visited April 3, 2004) (discussing
"Shared Solution" and Legacy Parkway). UDOT and Fluor Ames Kraemer decided
to limit work on the Legacy Parkway to the northern part of the project because of
potential lawsuits. See id. (describing proposed construction of Legacy Parkway).
35. See Utahns I, 180 F. Supp. 2d. at 1286-88 (explaining that remand is rem-
edy sought so federal agencies can perform NEPA and CWA analysis).
36. See id. at 1287 (stating Utahns believed federal agencies violated both
CWA and NEPA).
37. See id. (stating remedy sought by Utahns).
5
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Parkway and did not address the project's adverse impacts on the
surrounding environment. 38
The Utah District Court determined that it must decide only
one question: whether the Corps and the FHWA complied with the
law when it issued its ROD.39 The district court found that the
Corps complied with the law, and therefore, it upheld the ROD. 40
The court concluded that neither the Corps nor the FHWA violated
NEPA or the CWA.41 Furthermore, the court denied the Utahns'
request to revise or supplement the EIS.42 According to the district
court, though the federal agencies could have produced a more
thorough EIS, the agencies did not consider alternatives in an arbi-
trary or capricious manner.43 The Utahns appealed this case to the
Tenth Circuit based on the district court's decision. 44
III. BACKGROUND
A. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
During the late 1960s, Congress observed that federal agencies
lacked environmental awareness because many of their policies
conflicted with the "general public interest."45 Consequently, Con-
38. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2002) (addressing Utahns'
claim that federal agencies violated CWA and NEPA when agencies did not prop-
erly and sufficiently evaluate environmental impacts and ignored other NEPA
requirements).
39. See Utahns I, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (categorizing question presented in
case as narrow). The district court was not asked to decide whether the FHWA's
approval or the section 404(b) permit should have been granted or whether the
Legacy Parkway should have been built. See id. (explaining issues addressed by
district court).
40. See id. at 1292-93 (ruling in favor of Legacy Parkway Project).
41. See id. at 1293. While the court did not agree with the Agencies' decisions,
the district court concluded that the FHWA and the Corps decisions regarding the
Legacy Parkway were lawful under NEPA or the CWA. See id. at 1292.
42. See id. at 1291 (finding that FEIS satisfied NEPA requirements in form and
content).
43. See id. at 1292-93 (explaining holding of case). The court reasoned that
the Agencies could have taken a "harder look" at environmental impacts and rea-
sonable alternatives, but that did not mean the federal agencies' evaluations vio-
lated NEPA. See id. at 1292 (stating what analysis satisfies NEPA). After the district
court's decision was rendered, work on the project restarted. See UDOTLegacy Park
Project: History available at http://www.udot.utah.gov/legacy/Project%20-History.
htm (last visited April 3, 2004) (describing events behind and history of Legacy
Parkway). Work progressed until the Tenth Circuit issued an injunction. See id.
44. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152, 1161 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating grounds for
appeal).
45. See Maria C. Holland, Comment, Judicial Review of Compliance with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act: An Opportunity for the Rule of Reason, 12 B.C. ENVTL.
Aer. L. REv. 743, 757 (1985) (addressing policies behind NEPA and its legislative
history).
6
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gress enacted NEPA to hold the federal government responsible for
protecting and preserving the environment. 46 Soon after its enact-
ment, environmental groups and politicians acknowledged NEPA
as one of the most important environmental laws, claiming NEPA
triggered the "environmental decade" of the 1970s.
4 7
According to the United States Supreme Court, NEPA has
"twin aims".48 First, it forces federal agencies to "consider every sig-
nificant aspect of the environmental impact of proposed action."49
Second, NEPA requires that a federal agency inform the public of
the proposed action's possible environmental impacts and explain
how the agency addresses those impacts.50 "The thrust of the
[NEPA] is . . . that environmental concerns be integrated into the
very process of agency decision-making."5 1
NEPA prescribes steps federal agencies must follow when con-
sidering a proposed action's environmental impacts. 52 It provides
46. See id. (explaining purpose of enacting NEPA). Before NEPA, a federal
agency decision-maker had little, if any, information on the environmental impacts
of a proposed action. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitor-
ing and Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903,
910 (2002) (noting agencies were not required to compile environmental informa-
tion before enactment of NEPA).
47. See Karkkainen, supra note 46, at 904 (discussing NEPA's role in accessing
government's environmental performance).
48. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (discussing goals of NEPA).
49. See id. (holding that Nuclear Regulation Commission complied with
NEPA's requirements of considering environmental consideration and disclosing
EISs).
50. See id.; see also, Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
349 (1989) (noting that NEPA "guarantees that the relevant information will be
made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the deci-
sionmaking process and the implementation of that decision").
51. Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1115 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Andrus v.
Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979)) (explaining relationship between environ-
mental process and agency actions).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214332 (2001) (describing NEPA requirements and
procedures). NEPA provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set
forth in this chapter, and
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach ... in planning
and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will
insure that presently unqualified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmak-
ing along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affect-
7
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that agencies take a "hard look" at the proposed action's environ-
mental consequences by using public comment and credible scien-
tific information. 53 Accordingly, NEPA mandates a federal agency
to conduct an Environmental Assessment when proposing legisla-
tion or taking a federal action that may impact the environment. 54
NEPA requires federal agencies to produce and publicly issue a de-
tailed statement on the proposed action's environmental impacts,
which is commonly known as an Environmental Impact
Statement. 55
When faced with a NEPA issue, a court must determine two
issues.5 6 First, the court must decide whether the federal agency
acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" when considering the action's
environmental impact.57 Second, it must determine whether the
ing the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement
by the responsible official on ....
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2001).
53. See Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1036 (10th Cir.
2001); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (2001) (assessing what "hard look" anal-
ysis entails). NEPA states that all federal agencies must:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (2001).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2001) (describing required federal agency coopera-
tion and reports); see also Council on Environmental Quality, NEPA and Agency
Planning, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. pts. 1501.4, 1508.9 (2003) (detailing
Environmental Assessment requirement).
55. See Karkkainen, supra note 46, at 909 (discussing paperwork requirements
of NEPA). Nevertheless, NEPA does not require that an agency reach a particular
conclusion. See Custer County, 256 F.3d at 1034 (citing Colorado Envtl. Coalition v.
Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1999)) (quotation marks and citations
omitted) (noting NEPA allows agencies to make decisions, but agencies need to
meet statutory requirements). Federal agencies do not have to give more weight
to environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. See Citizens'
Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. United States Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1022
(10th Cir. 2002) (determining that "hard look" requirement is satisfied when
agency develops required EIS).
56. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining how courts
handle NEPA cases).
57. See id. (stating federal agencies cannot make arbitrarily and capricious de-
cisions when approving proposed actions). The Administrative Procedure Act al-
8
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agency properly disclosed accurate and sufficient information to
the public.58
B. Environmental Impact Statements
NEPA mandates that federal agencies prepare an EIS as a way
to make them responsible for any environmental impacts. 59 Con-
gress required EISs to achieve NEPA's statutory goal of instilling
environmental awareness in agency decision-making.60 An EIS
serves two purposes: (1) to ensure that federal agencies have ade-
quate information about the action's potential environmental im-
pacts and any reasonable and practicable alternatives to the
proposed actions; and (2) to inform the public of any potential en-
vironmental impacts of the proposed action.61 This forces federal
agencies to use an organized approach when planning and propos-
ing projects. 62 As a result, the EIS provides for a thorough discus-
sion of significant potential environmental impacts, which federal
agencies have historically overlooked. 63
An adequately prepared EIS lists any reasonable alternatives to
a proposed action, publicly discloses all potential environmental
impacts and considers the public's response to the proposed ac-
lows courts to set aside any arbitrary or capricious agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704
(2001) (outlining APA's judicial review).
58. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1163 (stating that agency must publicly disclose
environmental impacts of project).
59. See Holland, supra note 45, at 767 (describing federal agencies as account-
able for environmental impacts of federal actions).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2001) (defining purpose of NEPA); see also Council
on Environmental Quality, Purpose, Policy, and Mandate, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500.1
(2003) (describing purpose of EIS).
61. See Holland, supra note 45, at 769 (explaining these standards hold fed-
eral agencies responsible for consequences and effects of its actions).
62. See id. (noting that Congress' enacted EIS requirement to enforce federal
agencies to follow specified procedures).
63. See Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statement,
40 C.F.R. pt. 1502.1 (2003). Section 1502.1 provides:
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as
an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in
the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government. It shall provide full and fair discussion of significant envi-
ronmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the
reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts
or enhance the quality of the human environment .... An environmen-
tal impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used
by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan
actions and make decisions.
9
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tion.64 Of utmost importance, NEPA requires that all federal agen-
cies prepare an adequate EIS before undertaking a "major federal
action".65 A "major federal action" is an action that significantly
affects human environmental quality.66 Additionally, major federal
actions often are subject to federal control and responsibility.67
1. Conflicts of Interest
Under federal law, a federal agency may either draft the EIS
itself or select a contractor to draft its EIS. 68 A conflict of interest
may arise when a federal agency does the latter.69 When an agency
selects a contractor to prepare its EIS, the contractor must "execute
a disclosure statement . . .specifying that [it has] no financial or
other interest in the outcome of the project."70 If a conflict arises,
the agency should disqualify the contractor from preparing its
EIS.
7 1
Determining if a conflict exists, however, is not always easy.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found no
conflict of interest existed when the Colorado Department of
Transportation (CDOT) supervised the hired contractor, protect-
ing the EIS' integrity in Ass'n Workingfor Aurora's Residential Environ-
64. See Elizabeth A. Roche, Note, The Continuing.Saga of Rippling Puddles, Small
Handles and Links of Chains: Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army of Corps of
Engineers, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 130 (2002) (examining EIS purpose and func-
tion). "The environmental impact statement serves the purpose of providing in-
formation to allow 'agency officials [to] make the best informed decisions based
upon an understanding of the environmental consequences of their actions.'"
Melaney Payne, Note, Critically Acclaimed But Not Critically Followed- The Inapplicabil-
ity of the National Environmental Policy Act to Federal Agency Actions: Douglas County v.
Babbitt, 7 VILL. EN\VrL. L.J. 339, 349 (1996) (defining components of properly
drafted impact statement).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2001) (requiring EIS for major federal actions).
66. See id. (explaining major federal action); see alsoJason J. Czarnezki, Com-
ment, Defining the Project Purpose Under NEPA: Promoting Consideration of Viable EIS
Alternatives, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 599, 601 (2003) (discussing process and benefits of
EIS).
67. See Council on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R.
pt. 1508.18 (2003) (defining major federal action).
68. See Council on Environmental Quality, Other Requirements of NEPA, 40
C.F.R. pt. 1506.5(c) (2003) (noting who may prepare EIS). If a contractor drafts
an EIS, the lead federal agency must guide the contractor in preparing the EIS.
See id. (stating agency's role in EIS preparation).
69. See Ass'n Working For Aurora's Residential Environment v. Colorado Dep't of
Transportation, 153 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter AWARE] (hold-
ing that no conflict of interest arose when subcontractor helped prepare EIS).
70. See id. at 1128 (citation omitted) (explaining when disclosure statement is
required).
71. See id. at 1129 (quoting Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEO's
National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,031
(March 23, 1981)) (stating when contractor should be disqualified).
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ment v. Colorado Dep't of Transportation (AWARE).72 In AWARE, the
Plaintiff contended that the EIS should have been invalidated be-
cause the contractor, who drafted the EIS, had an incentive to favor
a construction project over a non-construction alternative.73 The
Tenth Circuit, despite other courts' conflicted interpretations, de-
termined that a conflict of interest exists when a contractor has an
agreement or a guarantee of future work with the project or the
agency.7 4 In AWARE, however, the contract between CDOT and the
contractor did not involve such arrangement, eliminating any con-
flict of interest.75
Similarly, in Northern Crawfish Frog (Rana Areolata Circulosa) v.
The Federal Highway Administration,76 the Plaintiffs argued that the
federal agency's FEIS should be invalidated because the proposed
project would benefit clients of the contractor who prepared the
EIS. 77 Moreover, the Plaintiffs argued that the engineering firm in-
volved had a financial interest in the project's outcome as it would
profit from the business opportunities the project would create.78
The Kansas District Court held that no conflict of interest existed
on a contractor's part because the contract contained no guaran-
tees of future work, and the contractor would not receive a finan-
cial benefit from constructing the project. 79 Thus, the court
determined that, even if a conflict of interest existed, it would not
compromise the integrity behind the environmental process. 80
72. See id. According to the record on appeal, CDOT adequately supervised
the EIS process. See id. CDOT independently and thoroughly reviewed all of the
contractor's analyses. See id.
73. See id. at 1127 (outlining source of potential conflict of interest).
74. See AWARE, 153 F.3d at 1128 (explaining when conflict of interest may
occur). The Corps has inconsistently interpreted "conflict of interest" in the past,
but currently it states that, absent an agreement to construct the proposed project
or actual ownership of the construction site, it is unlikely a conflict of interest
exists. Id. at 1127 (stating that FHWA also has had difficulty defining "conflict of
interest").
75. See id. at 1128 (holding that CDOT overseeing contractor's preparation of
EIS cured any potential conflict of interest).
76. 858 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Kansas 1994).
77. See id. at 1525 (explaining Plaintiffs arguments). The Plaintiffs also chal-
lenged the FEIS' adequacy by arguing that the FEIS failed to consider reasonable
alternatives and the project's cumulative and indirect impacts. See id. at 1520.
78. See id. (stating Plaintiff's argument that conflict of interest existed because
engineering firm, contracted to assist in preparing DEIS, would profit).
79. See id. at 1529 (determining EIS was adequate because no conflict of inter-
est existed).
80. See id. (finding, even if NEPA was violated, integrity of NEPA process was
not compromised).
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2. Project Segmentation
Federal agencies often try to avoid NEPA because the Act cre-
ates additional procedures and requires the agencies to complete
additional paperwork to receive federal funding.81 Federal agen-
cies, however, may not avoid NEPA requirements by segmenting a
large project into small component parts.82 Generally, segmenting
projects is improper for purposes of preparing EISs.83 When draft-
ing an EIS, connected actions should be discussed in the same EIS,
as should actions that have common characteristics such as timing
and geography.84 In determining the appropriate scope of an EIS,
courts usually consider whether the proposed segment: (1) has logi-
cal termini; (2) has substantial independent utility; (3) does not
foreclose the opportunity to consider alternatives; and (4) does not
irretrievably commit federal funds for closely related projects.85
In segmentation cases, some courts have adopted an indepen-
dent utility test.86 When applying the independent utility test,
courts often find in favor of federal agencies and against environ-
mental groups. 87 For example, in Custer County Action Ass'n v. Gar-
81. See Brigham Daniels, A Legacy of Conflict: Utah's Growth and the Legacy High-
way, 1 HINCKLEYJouURNAL OF POLITICS, 51, 55 (1998) available at http://www.lib.
utah.edu/epubs/hinckley/vl/daniels.html (last visited April 5, 2004) (discussing
potential conflicts of interest that exist in Legacy Parkway Project).
82. See Terrence L. Thatcher, Understanding Interdependence in the Natural Envi-
ronment: Some Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 20 ErWL. L. 611, 631, (1990) (discussing how courts have treated
NEPA cases dealing with segmentation of large highway projects into smaller
components).
83. See Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477,
1483 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing NEPA requirements).
84. Council on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. pts.
1508.25(a) (1),(3) (2003) (explaining scope of EIS); see Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152,
1182 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that NEPA instructs federal agencies not to segment
project as way to make significant cumulative impacts appear less significant). A
connected action is defined as being closely related to other actions, and are iden-
tified by the following three factors: (1) does the action automatically trigger other
actions that may require environmental impact statements; (2) the action cannot
or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously;
and (3) is the action an interdependent part justified in a larger action. Council
on Environmental Quality, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.25(a) (1) (i)-
(iii) (2003) (defining connected action).
85. Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1182 (recognizing general rule against segmentation
does not apply in every situation).
86. See Thatcher, supra note 82, at 631 (explaining that under independent
utility test portion of highway could be lawfully segmented if it could logically pro-
ceed on its own).
87. See Roche, supra note 64, at 150 (analyzing court's ruling in Wetlands Ac-
tion Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs).
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vey,88 the Tenth Circuit applied the independent utility test and
found that the segmentation was appropriate and permissible. 89
In Custer County, the county contended that approval of the
Colorado Airspace Initiative violated NEPA.90 The Colorado Air-
space Initiative proposed changes to the National Airspace System,
which would provide training airspace for Colorado's Air National
Guard and address changes in the commercial airlines' arrival and
department corridors at a Denver airport.91 The county argued
that the FEIS was inadequate because of improper segmentation. 92
Specifically, the county insisted that only one EIS should have been
prepared, addressing the nationwide environmental impacts, as
well as the local environmental impacts of the military airspace. 93
The Tenth Circuit rejected the county's argument, concluding that
the Initiative could logically and rationally go forward independent
of the other military proposals across the United States.94
Likewise, in Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland,95 the
Fifth Circuit held that the federal agencies properly segmented the
transportation projects.96 This case arose when individual FEISs for
three segments of a highway improvement plan were filed.97 The
Plaintiffs argued that the transportation project required only one
EIS for all three segments because the segments collectively, not in-
dependently, reduced traffic.98 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs urged
that the FEIS was inadequate on the basis that the project was im-
properly segmented under NEPA.99
88. 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001)
89. See id. at 1037 (determining that projects having independent utility are
not connected actions requiring one EIS).
90. See id. (addressing Custer County's NEPA claim based on inadequate
FEIS).
91. See id. at 1028 (outlining proposed initiative).
92. See id. The court found that neither the record indicated nor the county
presented evidence of a clear nexus between the challenged Initiative and the
other military airspace proposals across the United States. See id.
93. See Custer County, 256 F.3d at 1037 (addressing challenge to FEIS's
adequacy).
94. See id. (holding that federal agencies properly segmented project under
NEPA).
95. 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981)
96. See id. at 439-40 (rejecting claim that separate EISs were needed for each
separate highway system project).
97. See id. at 433 (explaining highway improvement plan). The plan con-
tained three segments: (1) the Downtown Connector, (2) Brookwood and (3)
DeKalb 1-85. See id. (describing three segments of plan).
98. See id. at 439-40 (emphasis added) (addressing Plaintiffs claim of that pro-
ject was improperly segmented, and violated NEPA).
99. See id. at 439-42 (detailing grounds for Plaintiffs claim that FEIS was
inadequate).
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According to the Fifth Circuit, independent utility test deter-
mines whether the segment is a separate project or merely a
method to avoid NEPA requirements. 100 In Piedmont, the court
held that each segment of the project had its own transportation
purpose - reducing traffic. 01 Relying on precedent from other cir-
cuit courts, it concluded that projects can have independent utility
if they are interrelated as part of an overall transportation plan.10 2
C. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
The Government regulates and protects wetlands through sec-
tion 404 of the CWA.10 3 Section 404 prohibits the filling or dredg-
ing of wetlands without first obtaining a section 404(b) permit from
the Corps or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).10 4 Both
the Corps and EPA have regulatory authority in issuing section
404(b) permits.10 5
Under section 404(b) (1), the Corps decides whether to issue a
permit using substantive criteria developed by EPA.10 6 The criteria,
known as the section 404(b) (1) Guidelines, establishes a four-
prong test.'0 7 Under this test, the Corps will not issue a permit if a
100. See Piedmont, 637 F.2d at 440 (explaining purpose of independent utility
test). "The more important inquiry in such a situation is whether the projects have
independent utility." Id.
101. See id. (determining that each segment served its transportation purpose
regardless if other projects get built).
102. See id. at 441 (finding that interrelated parts of overall plan individually
contributed to improving traffic problems).
103. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001) (establishing federal wetlands regulation).
104. See id. at § 1344(a) (requiring permit to discharge or fill material into
waters).
105. See Roche, supra note 64, at 127-28 (explaining Corps' authority over va-
rious permit decisions). EPA also controls the regulation of wetlands, its enforce-
ment extends only to state-issued permits. See id. at 127-28, n. 57 (citation omitted)
(stating limits of EPA's control).
106. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1) (2001) (noting that guidelines shall be based
on criteria similar to that pertaining to territorial seas, contiguous zone and ocean
under section 1343(c)).
107. See Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance with the Guidelines,
40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10 (2004). First, the Corps cannot issue a permit for dredged or
fill material if a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge exists, and such
alternative would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem. Id. at pt.
230.10(a). Second, the Corps cannot issue a permit for the discharge of dredged
or fill material if the activity causes or contributes to violating state water quality
standards, applicable toxic effluent standards, the Endangered Species Act or the
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. Id. at pt. 230.10(b) (1)-
(4). Third, the proposed activity cannot significantly contribute to the degrading
of United States waters. Id. at pt. 230.10(c). Fourth, the Corps cannot issue a
permit unless appropriate and practicable steps have been taken to minimize the
potential adverse impacts of discharge on the aquatic ecosystem. Id. at pt.
230.10(d)
14
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practicable alternative exists that has less adverse environmental im-
pacts than the proposed project.108 A practicable alternative is an
available alternative that can be done after considering cost, tech-
nology and logistics.' 0 9 Further, for actions subject to NEPA, the
Corps will have sufficient paperwork and information to determine
whether to issue a permit. 10
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Utahns II, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether claimed defi-
ciencies in a Final Environmental Impact Statement were merely
"flyspecks" or whether they carried significant weight to defeat the
goals of informed decision-making and public comment.'11 To an-
swer these questions, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the requirements
of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Water Act
for evaluating a project's impact on the environment." 2 In light of
these Acts, the Tenth Circuit held that the FEIS was inadequate and
that the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously issued a Section 404(b)
permit.11
108. See id. at pt. 230.10(a) (noting that practical alternative cannot have
other significant adverse environmental consequences).
109. See id. at pt. 230.10(a)(3) (defining practicable alternative). The pre-
sumption that a practicable alternative exists for a non-water dependent project
does not automatically result in no permit, but the applicant must make a very
persuasive showing that no alternative exists. Sylvester v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 882 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (explaining
permit applicant's burden).
110. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.10(a) (4) (stating it may be necessary to supplement
NEPA paperwork if agency failed to consider specific alternatives or did not pro-
vide enough detail of these alternatives).
111. Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Custer County Ac-
tion Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1036, 1340 (10th Cir. 2001)).
112. See id. at 1164 (stating court applied APA's arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard to review district court's decision). An agency's administrative decisions can
only be set aside for "substantial procedural or substantive reasons", and "the court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Id. (citing Fund for Animals,
Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996)) (explaining when court decision can
be set aside).
113. See id. at 1192 (affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part
lower court's decision). The Tenth Circuit determined the FEIS was inadequate
on the following grounds: elimination of D&RG as a practicable alternative, failure
to consider alternative sequencing of the project, failure to consider integrating
the Legacy Parkway and public transit, and failure to consider impacts on wildlife.
Id. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps arbitrarily and capri-
ciously issued the section 404(b) permit because the permit lacked sufficient infor-
mation to determine whether D&RG was a practicable alternative, the permit
failed to consider whether a narrower median was a practicable alternative and it
did not consider the impacts to wildlife. Id.
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A. NEPA
1. Practicable Alternative
In determining whether an adequate FEIS was produced, the
Tenth Circuit addressed whether there were practicable alternatives
with less adverse environmental impacts.' 14 The Utahns contended
that there were at least three practicable alternatives to the Legacy
Parkway that would have reduced the highway project's environ-
mental impact."15
a. Denver & Rio Grande (D&RG) Regional Alignment and
Cost Analysis
The Utahns argued that the Agencies violated NEPA by elimi-
nating D&RG as a practicable alternative in the FEIS. 116 Specifi-
cally, the Utahns claimed that the Agencies violated NEPA by
eliminating D&RG as an alternative without verifying the cost esti-
mates supplied by UDOT.117 The Agencies argued that they elimi-
nated D&RG based on its high cost and its significant impact on the
environment. 118 The Agencies also argued that UDOT thoroughly
considered using a right of way for future light rail and mass
transit.' 19 The Tenth Circuit applied a cost analysis to determine if
the federal agencies truly considered D&RG as a practicable alter-
native. 120 In conducting this analysis, the Tenth Circuit empha-
114. See id. at 1164 (reasoning that practicable alternatives cannot be
speculative).
115. See id. (arguing practicable alternatives to Legacy Parkway included
aligning highway differently, narrowing highway configuration and implementing
mass transit alternative).
116. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1163. D&RG was one of two alternatives for the
Railroad Alignment, which was one of five regional alignments discussed in the
FEIS. See id. at n.3.
117. See id. at 1165 (noting record did not show that UDOT confirmed cost
estimates supplied or that they responded to public comments submitted by
Utahns).
118. See id. at 1164-65 (explaining why federal agencies eliminated D&RG as
alternative).
119. See id. The FEIS did mention that various organizations suggested pre-
serving D&RG right of way for future commuter rail use. See id. at 1165 (citation
omitted). Yet, the FEIS did not use this reason to eliminate D&RG as an alterna-
tive. See id.
120. See id. at 1165. The FEIS stated D&GR was rejected because the Legacy
Parkway would cost less; a $300 million estimate was made for the Legacy Parkway
whereas a $460 million estimate was made for D&RG. See id. (citing III Aplee. App.
931.2-31.3) (discussing cost estimates).
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sized that all information contained in the FEIS must be accurate,
and a federal agency must verify such accuracy. 121
After examining UDOT's process in analyzing costs, the Tenth
Circuit held that the Agencies failed to correctly verify the project's
cost estimates supplied by UDOT.1 22 The Tenth Circuit stated that
when a federal agency is determining the project's costs and alter-
natives, it must do more than meet technical requirements.1 23 The
court, however, recognized that an agency's estimate need not be
extremely detailed, but it must state an approximated cost. 12 4
Thus, the Agencies' failure to determine an approximate cost led
the Tenth Circuit to hold that the FEIS did not meet NEPA
requirements.1 25
2. Sequencing the "Shared Solution" as an Alternative
Another flaw in the FEIS was the failure to consider the se-
quencing of the "Shared Solution" as a viable alternative.1 26 The
Utahns argued that constructing the "Shared Solution" in a differ-
ent sequence was a reasonable alternative to the proposed pro-
ject.127 Alternative sequencing would require agencies to alter the
order of the project construction to achieve less environmentally
damaging results; here, the Utahns proposed to first expand the
public transit system to learn if this less environmentally harmful
alternative would reduce traffic. 128
121. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1165 (describing requirement for FEIS informa-
tion). NEPA and the Corps' regulations require that a federal agency verify if the
permit applicant supplied accurate information. See id. (citation omitted) (discuss-
ing that agency must supply reliable and correct information).
122. See id. (noting that Corps lacked records relating to estimated cost of
D&RG or Legacy Parkway Project).
123. See id. (explaining project cost analysis). The Tenth Circuit did not want
to imply that federal agencies must provide a tremendously detailed cost estimate.
See id. at 1166, n.6.
124. See id. at 1166 (explaining importance of relative costs in analyzing EIS
alternative).
125. See id. at 1165-1166. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit looked at the federal
agencies' other reason for eliminating D&RG as an alternative, which included its
significant impact to existing development, but it did not make a decision regard-
ing such reason because the record was insufficient. See id. at 1166.
126. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1170 (reasoning that agencies faced reasonable
and distinct alternative).
127. See id. at 1169. The Utahns also claimed that the FEIS failed to objec-
tively explore and evaluate whether changing the project's sequence would create
less environmental consequences. See id. The Utahns submitted expert opinion
explaining why public transit should be expanded before building new roads. See
id. at 1170.
128. See id. at 1169-70 (discussing failure to consider changing project's con-
struction sequence).
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The Tenth Circuit rejected both UDOT's and the FHWA's ar-
guments that future decisions regarding Utah's public transit are
not reasonable alternatives to the proposed project.129 Both fed-
eral agencies argued that expanding public transit was too specula-
tive and, if public transit was to expand, it would occur too distant
in time to consider it as a practicable alternative.' 30
The Tenth Circuit stated that expanding public transit before
constructing the Legacy Parkway was a reasonable alternative to
meet travel and population increases.13 1 It determined that the
Agencies failed to take a "hard look" at this alternative because they
did not rely on public comment, scientific findings and its own
analysis. 132 Thus, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Utahns' argument,
holding that altering the sequence of the proposed project was not
an unreasonable or a speculative alternative.1 33
3. Segmentation of Transportation Projects
In support of its claim, the Utahns also argued that NEPA re-
quires that the Agencies prepare a single EIS for the three compo-
nents of the proposed project. 34 The Agencies countered by
arguing that each component would serve its own independent
transportation purpose.13 5 The Tenth Circuit held that construct-
ing Legacy Parkway project would satisfy only one of the Shared
Solution project's three components. 136 Consequently, the Tenth
Circuit determined that each component under the Shared Solu-
tion plan must have its own EIS.137
129. See id. at 1170. The United States Department of Transportation argued
that adding the rail transit would occur five to fifteen years after the Legacy Park-
way. See id. (discussing proposed sequence of project).
130. See id. (stating Utah had not yet met federal rail funding requirements).
131. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1170 (finding three problems with UDOT's
argument: (1)expanding public transit is broader than just rail transit; (2)disputed
regional transit choices have not been decided and are not to be decided in future;
and (3)focus of FEIS is to meet year 2020s transportation need).
132. See id. (noting Agencies must thoroughly examine alternatives). For fur-
ther discussion on "hard look", see supra note 52-55 and accompanying text.
133. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1170 (finding alternative sequencing would not
have had significant environmental impacts).
134. See id. (characterizing all three projects as connected and similar actions,
which require single EIS).
135. See id. at 1184 (explaining federal agencies' counter-argument that proj-
ects can be reported in separate EISs).
136. See id. at 1182 (noting travel demand predictions show that by 2020 Utah
will need multi-model transportation solutions to meet its travel demands).
137. See id. at 1183-84. For discussion on connected actions see supra note 84
and accompanying text.
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The Tenth Circuit applied NEPA's statutory language to refute
the Utahns' argument.138 The Tenth Circuit relied on NEPA re-
quirement that federal agencies should discuss "connected" actions
in a single EIS. l3 9 The court reasoned that each project compo-
nent can serve its transportation purpose independent of the other
two components. 140 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit rationalized
that the Legacy Parkway component may proceed without recon-
structing 1-15 and therefore, the Legacy Parkway does not "automat-
ically trigger" reconstructing 1-15.141
B. NEPA Responsibility and Conflict of Interest
Here, the Corps and the FHWA allowed UDOT and its contrac-
tors to prepare the EIS.142 The Utahns' contended that this vio-
lated NEPA because the federal agencies did not sufficiently
participate and review the work of UDOT and that of UDOT's con-
tractors.143 The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of section 1506.5(C)
of NEPA supported its decision that the Corps and the FHWA
wrongfully allowed UDOT to prepare the FEIS. 144
The Tenth Circuit examined whether any appropriate remedy,
such as an injunction or requiring a new EIS, existed.1 45 The Tenth
138. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1182 (describing proper scope of EIS).
139. See id. at 1182-83 (relying on NEPA for holding).
140. See id. at 1184. The FEIS estimated that the Legacy Parkway would ac-
commodate sixteen percent of the year 2020 travel demand, reconstructing 1-15
would accommodate eight percent and the expanded transit would accommodate
twelve percent. Id. (citing I Aplee. App. At 323).
141. See id. (noting that 1-15 project will occur, if at all, after Legacy Parkway).
142. For further discussion on EIS preparation, see supra notes 59-67 and ac-
companying text.
143. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1185 (discussing Uthans' argument that EIS
used for Corps' analysis was insufficient and unlawful). Furthermore, the Utahns
claim the EIS was legally insufficient because UDOT, a state agency, prepared the
EIS for a state-funded project. See id.
144. See id. at 1186 (finding strong support in C.F.R. that wrong party pre-
pared FEIS). 40 C.F.R pt. 1506.5(c)provides:
[A] ny environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to the require-
ments of NEPA shall be prepared directly by or by a contractor selected
by the lead agency ... Contractors shall execute a disclosure statement
prepared by the lead agency, or where appropriate the cooperating
agency, specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the out-
come of the project. If the document is prepared by contract, the respon-
sible Federal official shall furnish guidance and participate in the
preparation and shall independently evaluate the statement prior to its
approval and take responsibility for its scope and contents.
Council of Environmental Quality, Other Requirements of NEPA, 40 C.F.R pt.
1506.5(c) (2003).
145. See Utahns I1, 305 F.3d at 1186 (noting district court never addressed is-
sue of remedies).
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Circuit turned to precedent for insight. 146 Relying on such prece-
dent, the Tenth Circuit determined that a conflict of interest did
not exist because the parties did not agree on a predetermined re-
sult.147 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit, while determining that
the Agencies wrongfully allowed UDOT to prepare the FEIS, con-
cluded that UDOT's EIS was not invalid because of a conflict of
interest.148 Ultimately, however, the Tenth Circuit did find the
FEIS inadequate on other grounds.
C. CWA
1. Practicable Alternatives
a. D&RG Regional Alignment
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps violated the CWA
because it issued the section 404(b) permit based on insufficient
information. 149 The Utahns argued that the Corps applied an in-
correct legal standard in rejecting D&RG as an alternative to the
Legacy Parkway. 150 The Tenth Circuit interpreted that the CWA's
test for issuing a permit asks whether the alternative with the small-
est impact on wetlands was impracticable, not whether the alterna-
tive cost less, or had a less environmental impact.151 However, the
Tenth Circuit noted that NEPA, not the CWA, governs the FEIS.152
As a result, the Tenth Circuit found that the Corps was not required
to select the best alternative or even the alternative with the small-
est impact on wetlands. 153
146. See id. (relying on AWAREs analysis for determining whether conflict of
interest existed). For further discussion on AWARE, see supra notes 72-75 and ac-
companying text.
147. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1186 (relying on precedent, which found that
when predetermined results exist and federal agencies do not independently re-
view EIS, then there is NEPA violation).
148. See id. (rejecting Utahns' claim that bias and "result-oriented nature"
tainted analysis of Legacy Parkway).
149. See id. at 1187 (noting permit applicant has burden of proof to show
permit guidelines were complied with).
150. See id. at 1186-87 (arguing CWA test is whether alternative with less wet-
lands impact is "impracticable" and UDOT, as permit applicant, must provide
"clear and convincing" evidence proving impracticability).
151. See id. at 1186 (explaining correct CWA test for considering alternatives).
152. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1186 (stating which environmental statute cor-
rectly applies). "Under CWA, the test is not whether a proposed project is 'better'
than an alternative with less wetlands impact because it would cost less and have
less impact on existing and future development." Id.
153. See id. at 1186-87 (mandating that federal agencies "rigorously explore
and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives").
[Vol. XVI: p. 61
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Furthermore, the Utahns contended that the Corps did not
meet the CWA's impracticability test.15 4 Relying on its discussion of
NEPA cost analysis, the Tenth Circuit found that the Corps violated
its own regulations by failing to verify the alternative's cost esti-
mates. 15 5 The Tenth Circuit supported this conclusion by looking
to the lack of evidence that D&RG's impacts made it impractica-
ble. 156 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the Corps arbitrar-
ily and capriciously issued the permit because it based this decision
on insufficient information regarding D&RG's practicability. 15 7
b. Narrower Right of Way
In addition, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps im-
properly issued the section 404(b) permit because it ignored modi-
fying the width of the highway's median as an alternative.158 The
Tenth Circuit stated that the CWA test does not involve determin-
ing whether the proposal features would make a more desirable
project. 159 Rather, the test forces agencies to determine whether
environmentally friendly alternatives are feasible. 160
After examining the relationship between the highway pro-
ject's purpose (reducing traffic) and the possible alternative of nar-
rowing the median, the Tenth Circuit found UDOT's proposed
wider median had no relevance to the project's purpose.161 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit held that the Corps should have examined a nar-
rower median as a rational alternative because such alternative
would reduce traffic. 162
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision in part
and reversed and remanded it in part.1 63 The court found that the
154. See id. (stating CWA definition of practicable).
155. See id. (holding that Corps lacked sufficient justification for issuing per-
mit because permit was based solely on high costs).
156. See id. (noting evidence existed that D&RG was more highly developed
compared to Legacy Parkway).
157. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1187 (determining permit was unlawfully is-
sued).
158. See id. at 1189 (reasoning that Corps failed to rationally assess narrower
median's practicability).
159. See id. at 1188 (explaining CWA test).
160. See id. 1188-89 (stating that if such alternative exists, then CWA mandates
that federal agencies consider and select alternative unless proven impracticable).
161. See id. at 1189 (exploring relationship between project's purpose and
modifications to highway).
162. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1189 (relying on CWA, which prevents Corps
from issuing § 404(b) permit if less damaging practicable alternative exists).
163. See id. at 1192 (affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part
District Court's decision). The district court concluded that the federal agencies'
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Agencies inadequately prepared the FEIS because they failed to
consider reasonable alternatives, such as a railway or alternative se-
quencing of the project.164 In addition, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that the Corp's arbitrarily and capriciously issued the
section 404(b) permit by relying on insufficient information and
failing to make an informed decision. 165
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Utahns II, the Tenth Circuit provided several hurdles for fed-
eral agencies, state agencies and contractors to overcome when
developing transportation projects. 166 Conversely, without much
discussion, the Tenth Circuit aided federal agencies, state agencies
and contractors by finding that segmentation is permissible in cer-
tain situations. 167 In this regard, the Tenth Circuit's determination
may enable federal agencies to make significant cumulative impacts
appear insignificant by segmenting the project.1 68
A. Contractor Conflict of Interest
Relying on NEPA's statutory language, the Tenth Circuit prop-
erly found that the Agencies erroneously adopted UDOT's EIS, de-
spite finding no existing conflict of interest. 69 Under NEPA, a
contractor who prepares an EIS must first submit a disclosure state-
ment specifying that it has no financial interest or other interest in
actions were lawful under NEPA and the CWA. See Utahns I, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1286,
1291-92 (D. Utah 2001).
164. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1192 (concluding that federal agencies incor-
rectly prepared FEIS). For further discussion on why FEIS was inadequate, see
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
165. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1192 (concluding that Corps did not consider
narrower median as practicable alternative). As a result, the Tenth Circuit decided
that the injunction should remain until the FHWA and the Corps resolved issues
raised in the opinion. See Utah Department of Transportation, Legacy Parkway
Project, available at http://www.udot.utah.gov/legacy/ (last visited April 3, 2004)
(stating litigation involved with Legacy Parkway).
166. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1192 (finding that federal agencies must con-
sider all reasonable alternatives and environmental impacts before issuing
permits).
167. See id. at 1184 ("The components, although interrelated a part of an
overall transportation plan, should individually contribute to alleviation of the traf-
fic problems in the Northern Corridor, and are therefore not improperly segments
as separate projects.").
168. See Thatcher, supra note 82 at 631 (explaining how impacts of smaller
segments may appear less forbidding).
169. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1186 (holding that Corps and FHWA incor-
rectly used UDOT's FEIS). Federal agencies must provide guidance and actively
participate in the EIS process when a contractor prepared it. See id.
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the project's outcome. 170 This requirement's purpose is "to mini-
mize the conflict of interest inherent in the situation . . . [when]
those outside the government .. . [come] to the government for
money, leases or permits while attempting to analyze the environ-
mental consequences of their getting it."17 1 If a contractor, who is
preparing the EIS, allegedly has a conflict of interest, a court must
determine whether the alleged conflict compromises the integrity
and objectivity of NEPA process. 172
In Utahns II, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that the Corps
and the FHWA erred in allowing UDOT and its contractors to pre-
pare the FEIS. 173 The Agencies' actions in Utahns II were clearly
distinguishable from the federal agencies' actions in AWARE and
Crawfish.174 In AWARE and Crawfish, the courts found that the fed-
eral agencies overcame any potential conflict of interest by actively
participating in NEPA process.' 75 Conversely, in Utahns II, the
Corps and the FHWA's failure to participate in the EIS preparation
allowed the Tenth Circuit to properly conclude that the Agencies
illegally delegated their NEPA responsibilities. 176
The Tenth Circuit correctly relied on AWARE to address
whether the alleged conflict of interest compromised the overall
integrity of NEPA process. 77 Unlike the district court, the Tenth
Circuit did address this issue; however, the Tenth Circuit did not
170. See AWARE, 153 F.3d 1122, 1127 (1998) (quoting Council on Environ-
mental Quality, Other Requirements of NEPA, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1506.5(c) (2001))
(describing proper disclosure statement).
171. See Northern Crawfish Frog (Rana Areolata Circulosa) v. The Federal Highway
Administration, 858 F. Supp. 1503, 1526 (D. Kansas 1994) (citation omitted)
(describing goal of disclosure statement).
172. See AWARE, 153 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Citizens Against Burtlington, Inc. v.
Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (emphasizing importance of maintain-
ing integrity of NEPA process). When an EIS is challenged based on an alleged
conflict of interest, the court must evaluate the agency's participation in and re-
view of the EIS process as a factual matter and then determine whether it should
be upheld. Id. (citation omitted).
173. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1186 (reasoning that clear language of 40 C.F.R.
pt. 1506.5(c) leads to such conclusion).
174. For further discussion of actions in AWARE and Crawfish, see supra notes
72-80 and accompanying text.
175. See AWARE, 153 F.3d at 1129 (finding Colorado Department of Transpor-
tation properly supervised over EIS process by independently reviewing all of con-
tractor's analyses); see Northern Crawfish Frog, 858 F. Supp. at 1526 (finding FHWA
carefully considered conflict of interest issue).
176. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1186 (finding that agencies illegally delegated
their obligations under NEPA).
177. See id. (finding AWARE informative and insightful).
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provide a thorough discussion on the subject of conflict.178 First,
Tenth Circuit did not discuss the NEPA required disclosure state-
ment for contractors preparing an EIS.179 Based on the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion, it is unclear whether the disclosure statement plays a
significant role in discovering and/or minimizing a conflict of
interest. 80
A disclosure statement would reduce conflicts of interest and
assure the public that the EIS analysis was prepared free of subjec-
tive and self-serving research and analysis.18' In Utahns II, the
Tenth Circuit did not clarify whether UDOT had to submit a disclo-
sure statement when the FHWA and the Corps simply adopted
UDOT's DEIS.182 If UDOT participated in drafting the EIS, then
the Tenth Circuit should have invalidated the EIS because a disclo-
sure statement was not filed.'8 3
In Utahns II, however, the Tenth Circuit found there was no
conflict of interest because there was no contract between the fed-
eral agencies and UDOT for a predetermined result. 184 Precedent
shows that a conflict of interest can be a significant factor in deter-
mining an EIS's adequacy. 185 A serious conflict of interest could
negate the goal of environmental regulations in providing a system
of checks and balances.' 8 6
In AWARE, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal agency's active
role in the EIS process strengthened the integrity of the overall pro-
178. See id. (noting that district court failed to address conflict of interest is-
sue). The Utahns presented to the Tenth Circuit four examples of bias that influ-
enced the Legacy Parkway's EIS, including that the EIS' tone advocated a specific
position. See id. (examining various forms of possible bias).
179. See Northern Crawfish Frog, 858 F. Supp. at 1527 (describing disclosure
statements as method to prevent conflicts of interest).
180. See Utahns 1, 305 F.3d at 1186 (lacking discussion of disclosure
statements).
181. Northern Crawfish Frog, 858 F. Supp. at 1528 (citing Council on Environ-
ment, Other Requirements of NEPA, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1506.5 (c)) (explaining safe-
guards of disclosure statements).
182. See Utahns I, 305 F.3d at 1186 (finding EIS adequate without discussing
disclosure statements).
183. See Northern Crawfish Frog, 858 F. Supp. at 1527 (requiring execution of
disclosure statement in similar situation).
184. See Utahns I, 305 F.3d at 1186 (concluding that in this case there was no
preordained result, but conflict of interest issue did merit court's concern).
185. See AWARE, 153 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that ultimate
question for court addressing alleged conflict of interest breach is whether breach
compromised integrity of NEPA process).
186. See Northern Crawfish Frog, 858 F. Supp. at 1528 (discussing serious ramifi-
cations of conflict of interest affecting NEPA process).
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cess, and, therefore, eliminated potential conflicts of interest.18 7 In
Utahns II, the Tenth Circuit overlooked this and diminished the im-
portance of the FI-1WA's and the Corps' inactive role in the entire
NEPA process.' 88 If the Tenth Circuit would have conducted a
more thorough analysis concerning whether NEPA's integrity was
compromised, it most likely would have held the EIS inadequate on
this ground.189
B. Segmentation and the EIS
The Tenth Circuit held that the Corps permissibly segmented
the Shared Solution Project under NEPA, explaining that the Leg-
acy Parkway did not automatically trigger reconstructing 1-15 and
expanding the mass transit. 190 The Tenth Circuit stated that, given
the deferential standard of review, it could not conclude that the
FEIS was deficient because the federal agencies did not evaluate the
whole project, its three components, in a single EIS.' 91 This ap-
peared to be a victory for federal agencies, but environmental
groups in future cases may still raise a segmentation challenge, ar-
guing the Tenth Circuit reached its decision based on a deferential
standard of review, and not NEPA's statutory language. 92
Despite the Utahns' valid arguments, the Tenth Circuit al-
lowed the Agencies to segment the project.193 Relying on Piedmont
and Custer County, the Tenth Circuit correctly applied the indepen-
dent utility test; however, it is unclear whether the court reached
the proper conclusion. 194 In Piedmont, the Fifth Circuit permitted
segmentation because each component clearly fulfilled an individ-
187. See AWARE, 153 F.3d at 1129 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that court
failed to enforce conflict of interest provision to preserve public faith in NEPA
process).
188. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1186 (finding EIS was adequate because there
was no predetermined result).
189. See AWARE, 153 F.3d at 1129, n.7 (explaining critical importance of pub-
lic support).
190. For further discussion of "connected action," see supra note 84 and ac-
companying text.
191. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1184.
192. See id. at 1184 (emphasizing its deferential standard of review, but not
sufficiently emphasizing NEPA's language).
193. See id. at 1183-84. The Utahns argue that the transportation needs will
not be met because the FEIS expressly stated that 2020s transportation needs will
not be met without constructing both the Legacy Parkway and improving 1-15. See
id. at 1183 (emphasis added) (evaluating Utahns' argument).
194. See Thatcher, supra note 82, at 631 (stating that independent utility test is
applied in segmentation cases).
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ual transportation purpose. 195 In Custer County, the segment under
dispute was specifically designed for one particular purpose.196
Here, the Tenth Circuit stated that each component, including the
Legacy Parkway component, should individually reduce traffic
problems in the North Corridor. 197 However, with the Shared Solu-
tion project, certain components cannot be completed until other
components are constructed, which raises serious doubts about
whether each segment has a true individual purpose. 198
Assuming the Tenth Circuit correctly determined that each
component had an individual transportation purpose and an inde-
pendent utility, it is irrelevant that the components were part of an
overall transportation plan. 199 As long as the Legacy Parkway com-
ponent has an individual transportation purpose, it may require a
separate EIS, even if it is part of an overall plan.200 If each compo-
nent or segment has independent utility, then individual approval
will not commit future resources or limit available alternatives.20
The Tenth Circuit, like other courts, reinforced the idea that seg-
mentation of a project is permissible in certain situations.20 2
VI. IMPACT
Considering the continual growth in Utah's population and
travel demand, the Tenth Circuit's decision may significantly im-
pact future cases involving proposed transportation plans to meet
195. See Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 439 (5th
Cir. 1981) (explaining why segmentation was permitted). The Fifth Circuit held
that segmentation was appropriate because the Brookwood Interchange Project
would alleviate the congestion where the two highways intersect, whereas the
DeKalb 1-85 Segment should help improve traffic flow. See id. at 440-41 (explain-
ing when segmentation is lawful).
196. See Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1037 (10th Cir.
2001) ("The Initiative was designed specifically to provide the necessary airspace
for the 140th Tactical Fighter Wing of the Colorado ANG to be able to train with
the F-16 fighter jet under realistic conditions, and to make changes in commercial
aircraft arrival and departure corridors required for operation of the new Denver
International Airport.").
197. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1184 (stating relationship of components to
overall transportation project).
198. See id. at 1183-84 (stating project's order of construction and transporta-
tion purpose that each component will have).
199. See Piedmont, 637 F.2d at 441 (holding that interrelated parts of overall
transportation plan lawfully could be segmented).
200. For further discussion on "independent utility," see supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
201. See Piedmont, 637 F.2d at 441 (dismissing possible problems with indepen-
dent utility test).
202. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1184 (discussing various demands for transpor-
tation plans).
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these demands.203 Taking a more aggressive approach than the
lower court, the Tenth Circuit's holding requires federal agencies
and contractors to take a much "harder look" at a project's reasona-
ble alternatives and possible adverse environmental impacts. 20 4
Judge Jenkins, who decided this case in the District Court, believed
that if one disagreed with the policy decisions made, as was the case
here, they should seek change through the ballot box and the elec-
tion process, and not the court.20 5 The lower court's decision ena-
bled federal agencies and contractors to satisfy NEPA requirements
by meeting the bare minimum, broadly applying NEPA's
language. 20 6
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit followed a more strict reading of
NEPA and the CWA.207 Accordingly, federal agencies must actively
participate in preparing an EIS by considering all reasonable alter-
natives, and all environments impacts.20 8 Under the Tenth Circuit
standard, an agency cannot merely adopt an EIS drafted by a con-
tractor.20 9 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit moves slightly away from
NEPA's purpose by allowing project segmentation. 2 10
This case appears to be an important win for environmental
groups.2 11 In future cases, environmental groups may rely on
Utahns II to argue that the federal agencies must rigorously con-
sider the potential adverse impacts on the environment when devel-
oping and proposing transportation plans.2 12
Kelli M. Keenan
203. For further discussion of Utah's future transportation needs, see supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
204. See generally Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152 (finding EIS inadequate because it
failed to consider reasonable alternatives and impacts on wildlife and wetlands).
205. See Utahns 1, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292-93 (D. Utah 2001) (noting that
courts cannot alter legislative policy choices).
206. See id. at 1292 (holding EIS was adequate even though federal agencies
did not consider reasonable alternatives).
207. For further discussion on NEPA, see supra notes 45-58 and accompany-
ing text.
208. See generally Utahns II, 305 F.3d 1152 (finding FEIS inadequate for rea-
sons stated).
209. See id. at 1184-86 (explaining federal agency's NEPA responsibility).
210. For further discussion of segmentation, see supra notes 81-102 and ac-
companying text.
211. See Karkkainen, supra note 46, at 910 (noting that satisfying NEPA re-
quirements forces federal agencies to think more carefully about environment
before acting).
212. See Utahns II, 305 F.3d at 1166 (examining federal agencies' requirements
under NEPA).
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